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Abstract ― The paper builds on the Marxist concept of exploitation to explore the meaning of 
the Post Keynesian notion of uncertainty. Uncertainty is mediated by institutions and is 
distributed unevenly among different social groups. As different historical social formations 
entail different institutional structures, the distribution and nature of uncertainty will also differ. 
The configurations between class relations and uncertainty are analyzed for the capitalist, 
feudal and slave modes of production. It is demonstrated that modes of production do not only 
imply specific exploitative relations but also different relative distributions of uncertainty 
amongst classes. The joining of Marxian and Post Keynesian approaches allows for a richer 
understanding of exploitive relations and illuminates the full societal impact of uncertainty. It is 
shown that only in capitalism is the exploited class exposed to a substantial degree of economic 
uncertainty. 
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Uncertainty and exploitation in history 
 
Introduction 
Uncertainty is a pervasive feature in monetary production economies. Different social groups 
experience uncertainty in different ways. An investor may be worried about the future 
revenue streams of alternative investment projects. A worker may worry about having a job 
next year. Obviously the effects of uncertainty are mediated and shaped by the particular 
institutional setting of a society. One of the basic building blocks of these institutional 
structures are class structures. Therefore the question arises how class relations and the 
distribution of uncertainty are related. 
 
Uncertainty is a key category in (at least some versions of) Post Keynesian theory. The 
concept of (fundamental) uncertainty highlights the challenges individuals face in making 
decisions, which are due to the historical openness of social and economic processes. Similar 
to Marxists, some Post Keynesians use class analysis in macroeconomic analysis.1 However, 
Marxian economics is unique in combining class analysis with the notion of exploitation. 
Society, it is argued, is composed of different classes that fulfill different functions in the 
production process. Most modes of production are based on exploitation: there exists a class 
that is performing surplus labor and another one that is appropriating this surplus labor.  
 
This paper explores the boundaries and overlaps of these key concepts of Post Keynesian and 
                                                 
1 Many Post Keynesians prefer class analysis to methodological individualism, in particular Post Keynesian 
growth theory is based on class analysis. Classes are usually defined as income classes (e.g. Robinson 1965, 
chapter 1, Kalecki 1971). Class struggle or conflict is consequently regarded as a conflict over income with 
important feedbacks on the accumulation process (Robinson 1978, 17), but is not located at the level of 
production.  
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Marxian economics. As the effects of uncertainty are mediated by specific institutions, a 
deeper understanding of the significance of the concepts involved requires a historical 
approach. Rather than a general discussion in abstract terms, the question what the relation 
between uncertainty and the class structures is, will be investigated at the more specific level 
of different modes of production. The interrelation between exploitation and the distribution 
and nature of uncertainty will be analyzed for the capitalist, feudal and slave modes of 
production. 
 
The presumption of this paper is that different schools in heterodox economics are potentially 
complementary and could benefit from interaction and cross fertilization. The cross 
fertilization explored here is between Post Keynesian and Marxian concepts. In fact, both 
strands of economic thought share a similar historical (path-depended) approach towards 
economic analysis (Setterfield 2003, 371ff.). Similarly both analyze the capitalist system as a 
monetary production economy. The aim here is to investigate how these common 
methodological elements can be transformed into a fruitful analysis on a more concrete level. 
To be clear, this paper does not offer a Grand Synthesis. In particular little effort is made, at 
this stage, to address the potential methodological and theoretical problems that the use of 
concepts rooted in different theoretical approaches raise. Rather we wish to illustrate that 
cross fertilization, can be a fruitful enterprise that yields genuine insights. 
 
A clarification is necessary at the outset. We concentrate on stylized modes of production 
rather than on the description of existing societies. The configurations are analyzed for three 
modes of production: capitalism, feudalism and slavery. By design these modes of production 
eliminate much of the actual historical complexity to clarify key features of an economic and 
social system. These stylizations do have specific historical epochs in the background on 
which generalizations are based. It will therefore be helpful to make these explicit. In the 
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analysis of capitalism we follow standard Marxian analysis and thus adopt a focus on the 
capitalist system of the 19th century. The concept of feudalism is used with reference to the 
10th to 12th century and the notion of slavery refers to the 1st and 2nd century Roman Empire. 
Overall the modes of production analyzed do not claim historical accuracy, but are to be 
understood as ideal types. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic concepts of uncertainty and 
exploitation and their theoretical foundation. Section 3 analyzes uncertainty and exploitation 
in the capitalist mode of production. Section 4 discusses the feudal and section 5 the slave 
mode of production. Section 6 gives a comparison of the configurations across modes of 
production and concludes. 
 
Uncertainty, exploitation, and modes of production  
 
Work has been not distributed evenly among different classes in most of human history. Some 
classes live of the surplus labor of others. The specific organization of exploitative class 
relations has historically taken on different forms that are described as modes of production. 
This is the core of Marxian economic analysis. We shall first clarify the notion of exploitation 
and then the notion of the mode of production. In doing so, the analysis will focus on 
fundamental class positions. However, no simple or dichotomous class analysis is advocated. 
Therefore some intermediate and neutral class positions are also discussed. 
 
In defining exploitation Wright (1997) argues that exploitation involves “antagonistic 
interdependency of material interests”. He defines exploitation by means of the inverse 
interdependent welfare principle, the exclusion principle and the appropriation principle: 
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• “the welfare of the exploiter is at the expense of the exploited” 
• “exclusion of the exploited from access to … certain important productive resources” 
• “appropriation of the fruits of labor of the exploited by those who control the relevant 
productive resources” (Wright 1997, 10) 
The argument proposed in this paper does not rest on the labor theory of value, which is often 
used as the foundation of a theory of exploitation. Rather it is based on unequal distributions 
of work and consumption possibilities. Typically exploitative relations also involve some 
form of command, and thus power, relations. 
 
The mode of production is defined as “the specific economic form in which the owner of the 
means of production extracts unpaid surplus labor from the direct producers” (Jessop 1990, 
289). This concept is used here to describe the structure of (Western) societies, in particular 
the social division of labor and income. A capitalist, a feudal and a slave mode of production 
will be distinguished. These are defined with respect to the fundamental relation of 
exploitation and the corresponding class positions. Actual historical social formations are of 
course more complex than such a bipolar class analysis would suggest. A specific society will 
be a social formation comprising more than one mode of production, with one of them 
typically being dominant. Moreover, various intermediate classes as well as non-class groups 
may play an important role for political or economic reasons.2 In the analysis some 
intermediate class positions will be discussed. This is a difficult task, however. While there is 
a substantial literature on intermediate class positions for the capitalist mode of production 
(Wright 1989), there is hardly any conceptual analysis of intermediate class positions for pre-
capitalist modes of production. We speak of intermediate class positions when a certain group 
                                                 
2 In a recent analysis of the reasons for the decline of the middle class Pressman (2007) highlights the importance 
of the middle class for the political and economic reproduction of capitalist economies. His notion of the middle 
class is descriptive and not based on a theory of the production process. However, his conclusion that the middle 
class plays a vital role is consistent with the argument presented in this paper. 
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performs functions of the exploiting as well as the exploited class. Neutral class positions 
(with respect to a given mode of production) refer to positions that are not related to the 
dominant fundamental class process. They may be outside exploitative relations3 (such as 
independent producers) or belong to other class structures that play a subordinate role. 
 
In the debates on Marxist theory of history there is a tension between those emphasizing the 
determinant role of the development of the means of production (e.g. Cohen 1979) and those 
highlighting the role of class struggle (often associated with the British school of Marxist 
historians, e.g. Thompson 1966). The approach taken here is closer in spirit to the latter. As 
the aim of this paper is (static) comparisons of uncertainty associated with different class 
positions in various modes of production, the disagreement on the relative weight of different 
technological and social factors as determinants of historical outcomes is of little significance 
for our argument. Still, class relations will play an important part in our argument, the forces 
of production will not.  
 
The usefulness of the Marxian approach is that it conceptualizes societies as consisting of 
various classes defined by their positions and functions with respect to the production process. 
Thus the term mode of production is used to describe stylized social formations in history. No 
claim of historical accuracy is made. Rather the interesting, and novel, question investigated 
is what the implication of these historical formations on the distribution of uncertainty is. 
 
Fundamental uncertainty is often cited as core concept in defining Post Keynesian 
economics.4 Fundamental uncertainty is a result of the fact that economic processes in the real 
                                                 
3 “Outside” here refers to the economic structure. These groups however may have alliances and therefore be 
politically or ideologically involved in the reproduction of the fundamental class process.  
4 A frequent distinction that goes back to Hamouda and Harcourt (1988) identifies three distinct groups within 
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world do not follow ergodic patterns. Under such circumstances no probability distribution for 
outcomes can be given. This inability to give probability distributions does not merely reflect 
the limited knowledge or information processing abilities of humans but is a reflection of the 
openness of the historical process in which human societies and economies evolve. 
“Uncertainty in general refers to situations where probability cannot be measured. This 
immeasurability arises from the nature of the real world” (Dow 1995, 118).  
 
To clarify the concept of uncertainty, let us quote a well known passage from Keynes: 
 
"The sense in which I am using the term is that in which the prospect of a European war is 
uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of interest twenty years hence, or the 
obsolescence of a new invention, or the position of private wealth-owners in the social system 
in 1970. About these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable 
probability whatever. We simply do not know. Nevertheless, the necessity for action and for 
decision compels us as practical men to do our best to overlook this awkward fact and to 
behave exactly as we should if we had behind us a good Benthamite calculation of a series of 
prospective advantages and disadvantages, each multiplied by its appropriate probability, 
waiting to be summed." Keynes 1937, 214  
 
Keynes did not claim that all relevant processes were subject to fundamental uncertainty. 
Rather he cites a game of roulette as a counterexample. Moreover “the expectation of life is 
only slightly uncertain. Even the weather is only moderately uncertain.” (Keynes 1937, 214). 
Keynes viewed the world as consisting of different degrees of uncertainty rather than in a 
dichotomy of uncertainty and probabilistic certainty (Keynes 1973b, Chap. 3; see also 
Carabelli 1995).  
 
In Post Keynesian Economics several important implications of the concept of uncertainty 
                                                                                                                                                        
Post Keynesian economics, which are commonly referred to as Kaleckians, Sraffians and Fundamentalist 
Keynesians. The latter approach is often associated with its emphasis on uncertainty and, in consequence, its 
distinct role of money (Gerrard 2003). 
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have been derived. Firstly, uncertainty is the basis for liquidity preference. Investors keep 
liquid assets despite their low return to maintain flexibility (Davidson 1994, Chap 6). 
Secondly, some Post Keynesians have derived a privilege of short run analysis from 
uncertainty (Vickers 1993). Thirdly, the possibility of structural breaks and sudden shifts in 
behavior has been highlighted (Lawson 1985, Keynes 1973, 315f). Fourthly, the rejection of 
ergodicity necessities open system analysis in historical time, which has far-reaching 
methodological implications (Lawson 1985). 
  
Keynes did not only conclude from the existence of fundamental uncertainty that people 
would be caught in paralysis or random voluntarism, but suggested that they would adopt and 
submit to conventions of behavior, rules of thumb and the like, not the least because they 
could not bear admitting that they "simply don't know" what the consequences of their actions 
will be. There are important aspects of the concept that remain open to debate. One may 
distinguish between proponents of fundamental uncertainty and proponents of conditional 
uncertainty (Ramskogler 2006, Chap. 1). The former emphasize the unpredictable nature of 
the economic environment and (implicitly) maintain that uncertainty is ontologically constant. 
From this they derive a predominant role for liquidity preference as a mean to cope with 
uncertainty (e.g. Davidson 2002, Dunn 2001). This approach can be contrasted with a group 
of authors who argue that conventionally and institutionally conditioned decision-making can 
lead to temporal (conditional) stability (Crotty 1994, Dymsik 1994). In this approach the 
institutional setting determines the (behavioral) impact of uncertainty. We build on the latter 
group in asserting that institutions and institutional behavior can affect the extent of 
uncertainty (without being able to annihilate it) but go further in arguing that uncertainty can 
not only be reduced but also distributed amongst social groups in a given societal formation.  
 
The issue of the distribution of uncertainty has received little attention in the Post Keynesian 
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debate so far. Indeed, most Post Keynesian arguments only discuss the investor’s experience 
of uncertainty, and thus imply that worker do not face uncertainty. Nor have Post Keynesians 
explored what, if any, the role of uncertainty is in pre-capitalist societies. While Marxists have 
a rich analysis of historical class structures, they have so far not explored the concept of 
uncertainty. 
 
To adapt the notion of uncertainty to the historical context, we will distinguish between 
different causes of uncertainty and spheres were its impact is felt. Systemic uncertainty refers 
to uncertainty arising from a specific social and economic configuration. For example, in 
medieval Europe, where the ruling class is a caste of warriors, this includes uncertainty due to 
military confrontations. It is counter posed to natural uncertainty that refers to natural 
phenomena like bad weather that may have devastating effects in agrarian economies. 
Systemic and natural uncertainty refer to the causes of uncertainty. Their effects will be 
mediated by institutions and differ across historical social formations. These effects may be 
located at the social sphere, among which we will highlight the economic and personal ones. 
Economic uncertainty refers to economic, often macroeconomic, phenomena and thus to the 
economic welfare of people (typically their income streams). Personal uncertainty refers to 
uncertainty regarding personal wellbeing (e.g. a person’s health). Of course both of these 
spheres or fields of impact of an uncertain event are interdependent. An uncertain economic 
event can affect the personal wellbeing of a person and vice versa (e.g. an sick person may not 
able to generate income). In the following the key interest is in the relative level of economic 
uncertainty. The analysis of pre-capitalist modes of production, where economic processes are 
embedded in different forms, does require a consideration of broader aspects uncertainty.  
 
On the conceptual level this paper proceeds along two novel routes. First, we assert that 
uncertainty can be distributed unevenly among different groups in society. Stockhammer 
 10
(2007) has argued that the institutional setting determines the distribution of uncertainty. The 
types of uncertain outcomes faced by economic agents differ in quality with their respective 
backgrounds. Workers and capitalists, men and women, native workers and migrant workers, 
skilled and unskilled workers confront different sets of choices and, consequently, different 
qualities of uncertainty. In a capitalist society workers experience uncertainty in the form of 
job insecurity (Stockhammer 2007). In this paper, this argument is applied to various 
historical formations.  
 
Second, we take a historical rather than an epistemological approach to uncertainty. As 
institutions play a crucial role in mediating the effects of uncertainty, and the institutional 
structure is historically contingent, a historically specific analysis is required for a proper 
understanding of uncertainty. We investigate how uncertainty is distributed in different social 
formations in history. To structure the analysis we rely on one of the basic organizing 
principles of societies: their class structures. Thus we build on the Marxist concepts of 
exploitation and mode of production to explore the meaning and role of a Post Keynesian 
concept in different historical configurations. 
 
Distribution of uncertainty in the capitalist mode of production 
 
In the Marxist tradition the capitalist mode of production is conceptualized around the two 
fundamental class positions of capitalists and wage laborers (workers). Workers, as Marx 
cynically remarked, are “free in the double sense” (Marx 1974, 272): they are (legally) free to 
sell their labor power and they are free from the means of production – they are unable to 
secure their reproduction outside the capitalist sphere.5 In the wage contract the capitalist 
                                                 
5 The analysis is based on the Marxist analysis of capitalism, which in turn is based on 19th century England. One 
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purchases labor power for a definite amount of time. The worker receives a wage and the 
capitalist takes no further responsibility in the reproduction of the worker. In the period 
specified in the wage contract, the worker has to follow the orders of the capitalist (which 
may be circumscribed by labor laws or by collective bargaining agreements)6. The output of 
the labor process in which the worker engages under supervision accrues to the capitalist. 
Typically this output will exceed the value7 represented by the wage paid and various other 
means of production used up in the production process; and the capitalist will therefore 
appropriate a surplus. However, the capitalist process of exploitation is not yet completed. 
The product has to be sold on the market; the surplus labor performed by the worker thus has 
to be realized in a market transaction.   
 
The capitalist mode of production thus presupposes the existence of markets. Capitalists 
(unlike medieval lords) do not directly consume the product of the exploited class. They have 
to sell it – which implies the possibility that they fail to sell the product and thus are unable to 
realize the surplus labor performed by workers. Moreover, and it presupposes that there exists 
a market of wage laborers. Workers sell their labor power on the market. They receive a 
money wage and purchase their means of subsistence on markets. The fact that the worker has 
to sell himself on the market also implies the possibility of unemployment. Different from 
goods markets, however, there is a systemic reason why markets for labor power will 
typically not clear (at full employment). A conflict of interest between workers and capitalist 
(if not always a conscious one) over the amount and intensity of work is a fundamental 
                                                                                                                                                        
of the weak points of this approach is that it downplays the role of the state. On occasion the modification 
through the welfare state is noted. 
6 However, this does not affect the principle nature of the wage contract as on of command: the activities of the 
worker are not precisely specified in the contract as already noted by Coase (1937). 
7 The question how this value should conceptualized and, consequently, measured (in some form of labor units 
or in monetary terms) has fuelled extensive debates among Marxists, but is not of further interest here. 
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characteristic of the class relation. The threat of firing plays an important role in disciplining 
the work force and their wage demands. And the firing threat is only a threat if there is 
unemployment.8
 
In the Keynesian tradition, capitalists are depicted as entrepreneurs who engage in investment 
projects whose future income streams are uncertain. This uncertainty is in part related to the 
nature of competition on markets, in part it is the openness of history in a more general sense. 
Irreversibilities and sunk costs make the outcome of investment decisions sensitive to future 
circumstances. Keynesians usually associate uncertainty with events that lie far in the future. 
However, this is a narrow notion. Uncertainty is also engrained in the production process due 
the conflicting interests of capital and labor, which is why command and power become so 
important (Stockhammer 2007). Moreover, workers face uncertainty over whether they will 
have a job in the future. 
 
The characterization of the capitalist with respect to the process of exploitation and his 
exposure to uncertainty is therefore straightforward. The capitalist is exploiting the worker 
and is exposed to a substantial degree of economic uncertainty. The actual amount of 
uncertainty will depend on the specific circumstances, not the least on the size of the firm. For 
a small capitalist the failure of one investment project may be threatening his very existence 
(and consequently come with a degradation to the working class). Large capitalists typically 
are hurt, but not existentially threatened by the failure of an investment project.  
 
Wage laborers, as the ones performing the work, are clearly exploited. Contrary to what the 
Keynesian analysis suggests (though rarely states explicitly), workers are also exposed to a 
substantial amount of economic uncertainty. While the typical form of uncertainty that 
                                                 
8 Bowles (1985) gives a Marxist interpretation of the efficiency wage model. 
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capitalists encounter is that of uncertainty over an investment project, workers experience 
uncertainty in the form of job insecurity (Stockhammer 2007). The firing threat is an integral, 
not an accidental, part of the labor relation. Moreover, the consequences of failed investment 
projects are passed on from the industrial capitalist to workers in the form of mass layoffs. 
Sustained unemployment can be a fundamental threat to the welfare and at times even the 
mere existence of the worker. Therefore the amount of economic uncertainty faced by 
workers has to be considered high (and may directly affect his personal uncertainty). Modern 
welfare states, however, mediate the uncertainty associated with a job loss (and other events) 
by providing unemployment benefits and other forms of support. 
 
Actual class formations are, of course, much more complicated than the analysis of 
’fundamental’ class positions suggests. In the modern corporation, the owner of the firm 
typically hires managers to organize the production process and supervise workers. The 
owners at times have no strong connection with particular firms, but rather hold (and sell) 
shares of firms. In the extreme case of rentiers, they invest their wealth in mixed portfolios of 
shares (in firms), government bonds and other financial assets with minimal, if any, 
involvement in the production process. The role of the classical industrial capitalist – in later 
times – thus gets split up into management, which exercises control, and rentiers, who are the 
legal owners of the firm. As managers do not generally have ownership in the firm, but are 
themselves employees, they occupy an intermediate class position (Wright’s 1997 new middle 
class). Rentiers perform no role in the production process proper other than that of a financier 
and they still receive a share of the profit (in the form of dividend or interest payments). They 
thus qualify as exploiters.  
 
Management is actively engaged in the process of exploitation by supervising workers, but it 
does so on someone else’s account. Typically managers receive a wage, often accompanied 
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by bonuses. Legally they are thus wage laborers, functionally however they fulfill parts of the 
role of the capitalist. As far as their income exceeds the value they themselves create, they 
receive part of the surplus from the owners. As managers themselves do not own substantial 
wealth, their position is subject to some uncertainty. The extent of this uncertainty strongly 
depends on the specific historical and institutional setting.  
 
Rentiers appropriate parts of the surplus that has been produced by workers in the form of 
distributed profits, or, more indirectly, in the form of interest payments or other form of 
financial income. They are clearly on the receiving end of exploitation. Rentiers, are exposed 
to lower degrees of uncertainty than the classical industrial capitalist, as they are not subject 
to the uncertainties of a particular, physical, investment project. As they, by definition, own 
substantial amount of liquid wealth, they are able to diversify their investments and liquidate 
investments quickly if they wish to do so. They are exposed to less uncertainty than industrial 
firms as the latter face a large amount of irreversibilities and sunk costs. Keynes pointed out 
that the flexibility of rentiers (“the fetish of liquidity”, Keynes 1973)9 at times comes at high 
social costs. This does not imply that rentiers can eliminate uncertainty. In particular episodes 
hyperinflations or major financial crises may erode even a well diversified wealth.  
 
Table 1 summarizes in a stylized fashion the different positions of the fundamental and 
intermediate class positions of the capitalist mode of production with respect to the extent of 
exploitation and the degree of uncertainty they are exposed to. Workers are exploited and face 
a high level of economic uncertainty. While this uncertainty may mediated by the welfare 
state, the paper argues that compared to other modes of production, in capitalism the exploited 
                                                 
9 “Of the maxims of orthodox finance none, surely, is more anti-social than the fetish of liquidity, the doctrine 
that it is a positive virtue on the part of investment institutions to concentrate their resources upon the holding of 
'liquid' securities. It forgets that there is no such thing as liquidity of investment for the community as a whole." 
(Keynes, 1973, 155) 
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carry a high level uncertainty – neither serfs nor slaves suffer from job insecurity10. Industrial 
capitalists are exploiters and subject to medium amounts of economic uncertainty. Small 
capitalists will face higher amounts of uncertainty than large ones. In contemporary 
capitalism, the functions of the industrial capitalist get split up. Managers, who in legal terms 
are also employees, take the role of organizing the production process and exercising control 
over workers. They occupy an intermediate class position and face a medium level of 
economic uncertainty. Rentiers are the nominal owners of the firm and thus the direct 
beneficiaries of exploitation and hold shares or other titles of ownership next other financial 
assets. As they are able to stay liquid, they face low levels of uncertainty, at least in normal 
times.  
 
Table 1 Uncertainty and exploitation in the capitalist mode of production 
 
 Position with respect to exploitation 
 Exploited 
Intermediate / 
Neutral 
Exploiter 
High Wage laborer   
Medium  Manager 
Industrial 
capitalist 
 
 
Exposure to 
economic 
uncertainty 
Low   Rentier 
 
 
Distribution of uncertainty in European feudalism 
 
The two fundamental classes of the feudal mode of production are serfs and feudal lords. The 
relationship between these two classes evolves around the organization of agrarian 
                                                 
10 No implication is intended that therefore the living quality of wage laborers is worse than that of serfs or 
slaves. Such a statement would be non-sensical. However, different distributions of uncertainty are a qualitative 
part of modes of production.  
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production. Serfs as the class that executes the work are concentrated in rural areas. They 
dispose (not to be confused with own) over their means of production and reproduce 
themselves through the products of their own work. Given this potentially independent 
position it is necessary for the upper class to establish strong institutional chains which enable 
them to impose exploitation over their serfs (Kahan 1973, 91). Contrary to older Marxist 
interpretations (Plechanov 1969, 70ff.) these chains do not necessarily have to be rooted in the 
economic sphere but also can originate out of a different subsystem (Habermas 1976, 159). In 
the feudal mode of production extensive, though divided and competing, legal rights form the 
basis of feudal exploitation of serfs (Epstein 2007, 18).  
 
Yet, the birthrights lords claim have to be justified. This justification derives from their 
function as lord protector and in addition, from the sermons of the Christian clergy11. Indeed 
lords are a class that vindicates its existence trough the fact that they protect against specific 
uncertainties. The system of European feudalism is politically fragmented building upon 
complicated and instable systems of cross-loyalties and interdependencies. Numerous rather 
strong lords and typically weak kings compete against another and armed conflicts are regular 
occurrences. Thus beside their juridical and administrative functions the most important 
function of a lord is the military one. In order to induce the knights that are required for such 
warfare to stay loyal the provision of privileges and luxury is required (Duby 1981, 230). The 
court lords thus have to hold implies that they have to bear considerable fixed costs. For this 
purpose extensive duties are imposed over serfs. The larger the land over which a lord has 
authority, the more means are available to support knights and the larger the power of the lord 
hence becomes. Nonetheless, land (including the inhibiting serfs) is attached to a lord by 
                                                 
11 The existence of the clergy as a subsumed class is an important feature of a feudal society that provides the 
conditions of existence of the fundamental class. The church had fiefs themselves and even claims for tithes. As 
a result they intensified exploitation but hardly altered the class structure.  
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birthrights and a market for land (or a market for serfs) does not exist. The only possibility for 
a lord to extend his power is to defeat another vassal on the battle field in order to appropriate 
his fief. The resulting fact that warfare is an intrinsic feature of the European feudal mode of 
production justifies the existence of the lord protector. Lords as a class of warriors are needed 
to protect from the uncertainty of warfare, which in turn exists because a class of warriors – 
the lords – exists.  
 
The complex system of cross-loyalties and multiple obligations rests upon feudal class 
relations. From the small castellan up to the high count the ruling class bases its position on 
the attribution and exhaustion of legal exploitative entitlements in exchange for war services. 
Furthermore courts, manorial households and the warrior caste of knights cause considerable 
costs which necessitates intensive exploitation. Thus lords force their wards to work heavy on 
their demesnes in the most work intense periods of the year and have the control over 
considerable parts of the serfs’ harvest trough tithes and other dues. Moreover they may have 
ban rights entitling them to exclusive privileges and monopolies e.g. the duty of serfs to use 
the lord’s mill. This systematic expropriation is based on their military function and often is 
expressed most obviously in their judicial function (Hilton 1985, 120). The surplus they 
expropriated subsequently is either consumed directly or exchanged against luxury produce in 
towns. While lords thus exploit heavily they share a common destiny with their serfs with 
regard to the uncertainty of their revenues.12 Crop failure – a constant threat in all pre-
industrial economies – certainly may also occur on manorial estates. This usually coincides 
with a crop failure on the serfs’ fields which further erodes the revenues of lords from 
monopolies, tithes and similar dues. In addition to these economic uncertainties lords also 
                                                 
12 Certainly the uncertainties associated with crop failure largely on the evolvement of the weather which – 
according to Keynes statement above – is only slightly uncertain. Yet, uncertainties are not an ontological 
constant but contingent on specific social formations. The essential dependence of the feudal mode of production 
on its agrarian output so to speak is a multiplier of these slight uncertainties. 
 18
face personal uncertainties as warfare is intrinsic to the feudal mode of production. Thus in 
addition their position forces them to face the uncertainties of warfare. Thus while lords face a 
medium degree of uncertainty with regard to economic aspects of uncertainty their systemic 
exposure to uncertainty is high. 
 
As indicated above, the adventures of lords in the military arena are enabled through the 
surplus that serfs produce. This class of producers is “bound” to the lords. They are not able to 
move freely and are subject to a variety of obligations. Serfs can dispose over a certain 
amount of land. Thus they have direct access to means of production which is protected by 
common law. This enables them to produce their means of subsistence themselves. This land 
nonetheless is assigned to a lord by privilege (nulle terre sans seigneur). Thus as 
compensation for being allowed to attend the lords’ fields, they have to perform soccage on 
the lords demesnes. Furthermore serfs are obligated to provide a variety of tributes. In 
extreme cases these tributes might reduce the crop over which serfs can freely dispose to a 
quarter of the total output. (Bauer and Matis 1988, 68). They are heavily exploited and 
typically unable to retain a substantial surplus. A minor part of the surplus is sold in small 
towns and regional markets. Once serfs have obtained property (which is hard enough) it is 
protected by common law. A stratification of serfs accompanies feudal societies (Hilton 1985, 
139 ff.). 
 
Nonetheless even a “wealthier” serf is hardly able to build up substantial reserves of staple 
food in a feudal society. Serfs depend heavily on what their fields yield and a crop failure 
might have disastrous effects. Economically they are, by and large, exposed to the same 
uncertainties as their lords. Still, as horrible as its impact can be, this is the only major 
uncertainty they face. The land that they attend to usually is entitled to them by common law 
and the installment of a new lord will make little difference to them economically. Once they 
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have obtained the right to attend to this or that field they barely run the danger of loosing it 
again. Neither the course of the business cycle nor even the arbitrariness of lords can 
substantially alter this situation. The given situation of duties and allegiances is protected by 
common law (Hilton 1985, 110). Despite their vulnerability to natural disasters serfs thus can 
be regarded as being exposed to a medium state of economic uncertainty.  
 
In a society which is based to a considerable extent on an intrinsic conflict within the ruling 
class it is hardly a surprise that a class of (potential) confederates can exist. Burghers living in 
urban conglomerates, where they enjoy a range of privileges, form this particular class. 
Economically such independent towns are not a necessary part of a feudal mode of 
production. Within the class relations between serfs and lords burghers hold a neutral class 
position. 13 Towns contribute to the welfare of lords through luxury products and aggravate 
warfare through the production of armory. Politically, their existence results from their 
position as potential allies within the politically fragmented system of feudalism.14 The most 
important activities of burghers are craftsmanship and long-distance trade. As serfs produce 
most of the tools and goods of daily use themselves towns cannot expect considerable demand 
from them (Roehl 1978, 73f.). Thus the most important production is the manufacture of 
armory and of luxury goods for the nobles (Thrupp 1978, 160 f.). In addition urban privileges 
are an important factor contributing to the welfare of burghers. They can tariff goods, have a 
variety of exclusive rights (e.g. to hold fares) and are institutionally protected from attacks of 
greedy lords.  
 
The internal economic nature of towns is characterized by a corporatist gild-system. Guilds 
                                                 
13 Within towns however there also exist relations based on dependency and potential exploitation. Having 
employees themselves they can be part of a non-feudal exploitation process.  
14 The origin of towns often has been attributed to the intrinsic feudal conflict between a typically weak king and 
typically strong lords. Hereby towns could – originally – flourish as potential allies under the kings’ protection.  
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control the supply and prices (Le Goff 1978, 53) and thus to a considerable extent regulate 
economic aspects of uncertainty to which burghers might be exposed. In addition guilds 
(often) provide some minimum social security for their members. Hence it is hardly surprising 
that membership of guilds is an exclusive and rather expensive affair. Though, once it is 
obtained, it guarantees relative security and comfortable wealth. Together with the privileges 
of towns, long-distance trade and their capital reserves guilds help to mitigate the uncertainty 
of a bad harvest which can erode large components of the demand for a towns’ production. 
Economic uncertainty is moderated considerably in towns (for burghers). To a substantial 
extent feudal towns can consider themselves to be relatively secure. And indeed the exposure 
to economic uncertainty in towns is relatively small. However this is “ … a feeling of security 
that still c[an] be convulsed by catastrophes… .“ (Le Goff 1978, 48). Of course epidemics or 
similar catastrophes still maintain the urban population in a higher state of personal 
uncertainty.  
 
Table 2 offers a stylized summary. Despite the personal uncertainty associated with arbitrary 
attacks of competitors lords are attributed with a medium degree of economic uncertainty. 
They exploit via a variety of tributes and soccage. The proportionate character of the bulk of 
these tributes though forces them to share the uncertainty associated with natural disasters and 
crop failures with their serfs. The economic uncertainty of serfs on the other hand also derives 
from the uncertainty that is associated with crop failure. Yet, in normal times they produce 
their own means of subsistence and they do not face the danger of being fired. Customary law 
prevents a straightforward expulsion from their lands. Thus – while being heavily exploited – 
serfs can be associated with a medium state of uncertainty. Burghers finally hold a by and 
large neutral position with regard to feudal exploitation. The surplus lords transfer to towns as 
well as serfs that flee feudal exploitation relate them with the feudal system but by no means 
does feudal production presuppose the existence of towns. They face personal uncertainties as 
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those of epidemics that are intrinsic to medieval towns. Nonetheless, being organized in a 
corporatist manner and as the centers of trade they are able to largely mitigate economic 
uncertainties.  
 
Table 2 Uncertainty and Exploitation in the feudal mode of production 
 Position with regard to exploitation 
 Yes 
Intermediate/ 
Neutral 
No 
High    
Medium Serf  Lord 
Exposure to 
economic 
uncertainty 
Low  Burgher  
 
Distribution of uncertainty in the (ancient) slave mode of production 
 
In order to analyze the typical features of a slave mode of production, the economy of ancient 
Rome seems to be the best reference period. On the one hand it was the dominating societal 
model of its days and not a mere anomaly of a world-wide capitalist system as the South 
American slavery system (Marx 1987, 59). On the other hand the pragmatist and 
institutionally homogenous character of the ancient Roman world – as opposed e.g. to the 
rather politically allotted character of ancient Greece – simplifies the analysis considerably 
without altering the results. Specifically the discussion will be based on the Roman Empire in 
the 1st to 2nd century.  
 
Two fundamental class positions are the defining element of each slave mode of production: 
slave owners and slaves. Slave owners own the largest part of the means of production, i.e. 
arable land, large parts of the production facilities and slaves. In a slave economy not the 
labor power of the slave is purchased for a definite amount of time but the slave himself for 
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an indefinite amount of time (i.e. his remaining life span). The slave then literally has to do 
whatever the slave owner commands him to do. Typically, hereby the largest part of slaves is 
allocated to agrarian production as it is easier to exploit slaves in the relatively unqualified 
activities on fields. This system of slave-based agrarian production then allows for a more 
intensive production and thus a higher output than e.g. subsistence peasantry. This higher 
output then serves two purposes. Firstly, it is used for the slaves’ subsistence. Secondly and 
more importantly it allows for a considerable surplus which is used for the enrichment and 
luxury consumption of remote urban slave owners and is sold on urban markets. The defining 
element of a slave mode of production is not that most of the production is effected by slaves. 
As long as there is a substantial surplus at all the defining element is that most of the 
appropriated surplus originates from slave production (De Ste. Croix 1984, 107). 
 
As a result of the existence of an agrarian surplus there is a certain role for markets within the 
overall economy (Temin 2006). The three most important markets that we thus can identify 
are: a market for slaves, a market for basic consumption goods (where especially the agrarian 
surplus is traded) and a market for luxury products. In addition it is worth noting that 
(contrary e.g. to feudalism) also arable land is tradable. 
 
From a slave owner’s point of view a slave then is nothing but an investment good or 
respectively a good for luxury consumption that has to be obtained on slave markets 
(Schumacher 2001, 44 ff.). A good fraction of the slaves that are traded (and of the overall 
slave population) is obtained through warfare and also through some trade with external clans. 
As a result the supply of slaves crucially depends on international relations and slave markets 
are subject to fluctuating prices; steadily increasing in peace time and dropping sharply in 
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(successful) wartimes.15  
 
The institutional mechanism around which the class relations between slaves and slave 
owners are organized is the total, legally sanctioned commoditization of the members of one 
of the respective classes, i.e. the slaves. For slaves it means that they cannot (legally) own 
anything, that they cannot (bindingly) marry and overall that they are a regarded as (capital) 
goods. Once slaves are obtained, all they produce is at the owner’s command. Slave owners 
do not engage in productive activities themselves. In fact slave owners economically depend 
on the slaves’ output. Still, it is possible that slaves become ill or injured, that they flee or 
commit suicide. Even if slaves are able to work properly, there is no guarantee that slave 
owners obtain a profit. Falling demand or a supply overhang for certain products might push 
prices down. The agrarian sector in slave economies might be struck by substantial harvest 
failure. It is possible that slaves do not even produce an output that is sufficient to maintain 
their own subsistence, not to mention a surplus. This is where the double-edged character of a 
slave – being legally an object, but physically a human being – becomes relevant. If in 
capitalist production there is a temporal increase say in the costs of energy, it is possible to 
turn off engines and restart them later. Certainly, “turning off” a slave is feasible. The open 
question however is how to restart the slave again. A rational slave owner will always accept 
costs to maintain his capital, i.e. his slaves (see Schumacher 2001, 277; Finley 1985, 120; 
most explicitly Bradley 2006, 74). This is a basic fact of slavery already identified by Engels 
(1988, 352). Thus slaves signify fixed costs. This is even more important as the slave supply 
usually is instable and fluctuating. In order to guarantee a sufficient workforce slaves have to 
be maintained over long periods. Thus, slaves also can signify sunken capital. The uncertainty 
of harvest failure and fluctuating prices has to be entirely borne by slave owners and can not 
                                                 
15 This especially is the case as the mortality amongst slaves is high (Schumacher 2001) and the typical work in 
which slaves are engaged leads to at least some degree of sexual segregation (Anderson 1974).  
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be shifted e.g. through firing. Moreover, in times of crop failures slave owners have to 
“maintain” their slaves and have to obtain the required means of subsistence for them 
elsewhere (e.g. as in ancient Rome trough imports). As an overall result slave owners exploit 
heavily. Given the combination of considerable fixed costs with the possibility of substantial 
harvest failure however they are also exposed to a substantial extent of economic uncertainty 
at the same time.  
 
The total commoditization of course has very important implications for slaves as well. 
Firstly, as already implied above, it is in the natural interest of slave owners to properly 
provide their slaves with sufficient food, clothing and shelter in order to preserve their capital. 
The deliberation of slave owners about their slave investment is a central feature of a slave 
economy. In the case of Rome this is very well documented in a seemingly endless row of 
accurate slave oriented prescriptions in the Roman civil law covering virtually every 
conceivable aspect of life (e.g. damage compensation in case of the ‘damage’ of a rented 
slave, slave owners’ discretion of punishment of slaves even after capital crimes etc.). The 
flipside of this however is that a slave can be relatively sure to be nourished well enough to 
survive – if hardly more than that. Starvation of the slave or incapability to work is not in the 
interest of the owner. The seemingly comfortable economic security slaves thus have comes 
with being subject to discretion (including corporal punishment) by the owner and to the most 
extreme forms of exploitation. Both result in a generally lower life expectancy of slaves. Hard 
labor and a total lack of leisure characterize a slaves’ life. All that the slave produces, earns or 
possesses first of all is the property of the slave owner by definition.16 Under slavery 
                                                 
16 Being a good themselves slaves where not entitled to own anything. Especially, if slaves where deployed in 
more sophisticated activities such as craftsmanship, the workshops often where led under peculium. This was a 
kind of separate estate on which a slave had extended possession rights. Legally, it still was the owner’s property 
and could be taken away from the slave anytime. The interesting observation hereby is that when exploitation is 
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exploitation is total including the legal entitlement to sexual abuse and the right to own and 
dispose of slaves’ offspring.  
 
An actual slave economy is more complicated than a fundamental class analysis suggests. An 
intermediate class position is held by the proles urbana17. The maintenance of a slave system 
– both with regard to a steady slave supply (through expansionist warfare) as well as with 
regard to the suppression of eventual slave insurgences – requires the existence of a large, free 
class of potential recruits. The urban population usually forms the backbone of this army 
(Weber 2002, 245). On the other hand the existence of a large non-agrarian population 
presupposes a substantial surplus which (contrasted with systems based on subsistence 
peasantry) only is possible in through a slave-based economy. This surplus is controlled by 
the politically powerful class of slave owners who typically oppress the proles. Slave owners 
control the political process together with the agrarian surplus and own the largest entities. In 
normal times this enables them to skim a considerable surplus off the proles. As a 
consequence slave owners try to transmit fluctuations in agrarian output via prices to the 
proles. Still, the urban proles are by and large different to rural slaves. People are poor but 
free. As such they form the medium stage in the tripartite dichotomy that characterizes Roman 
slave society: slaves are unfree and poor, the proles are free and poor and the aristocracy is 
free and rich. The interplay of these factors demonstrates that the solidarity of the proles with 
regard to other classes is ambiguous. As free beneficiaries of the agrarian surplus they support 
the maintenance of a slave mode of production, but being poor they often show their 
solidarity with slaves (see e.g. Finley 1985, 122). Especially the agglomeration of masses of 
                                                                                                                                                        
extended over more sophisticated activities it seemingly becomes necessary to introduce uncertainty (artificially) 
into the relationship.  
17 In a slave society also a part of free, poor population might live and work in the countryside. These whatsoever 
either hold a neutral position as free peasants or help to make the exploitation of slaves more efficient as 
daytallers and are not overly important to our analysis.  
 26
people increases the propensity to revolt. It is true that (apart from the city of Rome) regular 
welfare measurements were lacking in Roman antiquity. Such measurements were outside the 
interests of the ruling, slave owning aristocracy. Still, the evidence is overwhelming that 
public authorities and politically ambitious benefactors regularly stepped in when the situation 
on the food markets caused the danger of public insurgencies. Indeed “[t]he alleviation of 
food crises by private benefactors was so regular as to be an institutionalized feature of the 
society” (Garnsey, 1988, 15). The risk that solidarity between the proles and slaves arose on a 
broad scale simply could not be borne. Such interventions can be assumed as a structural 
feature of a tripartite class-structured slave economy 
 
In a stylized way the characteristics described above are summarized in table 3. Slaves are 
exploited heavily. The discretion over the distribution of virtually everything they produce 
accrues to their owners. They neither receive a certain pay for their work nor do they have the 
possibility to produce anything for themselves. They are personally subject to arbitrary 
treatment by their owners. Nonetheless their commoditization and existence as mere goods 
substantially moderates the scope of the owners’ arbitrariness. Indeed, slave owners usually 
will be prudent about their property and provide the means to keep their slaves alive. While 
slaves are exposed to a high level of personal uncertainty, there is little economic uncertainty 
(with regard to their means of subsistence). The reverse applies to the situation of slave 
owners. They do heavily exploit as the entire produce of slaves is at their disposal. Still, the 
fixed costs associated with slave-based production as well as the specific characteristics of a 
pre-industrial agrarian economy expose them to a high degree of uncertainty. With a twinkle 
of Jupiter’s eye a crop failure can turn their surplus production into heavy losses. 
Consequently slave owners face a high level of economic uncertainty. This carries even more 
weight as they are structurally prevented from transforming a reduced output into price-
increases. This is due to the existence of an amassment of poor but free urban proles. Given 
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the hierarchical situation on the markets of an ancient slave society they are subject to steady 
– even though relatively (as compared to slaves) modest – exploitation. Too sharp a price 
increase on the food market – vital for a chronically malnourished (Morris and Manning 2005, 
141) population – however runs the danger of being the last straw that triggers revolt amongst 
the very class that constitutes the back of the army. This leaves the proles in a situation of 
medium economic uncertainty as their uncertainty is mediated by the ruling slave owners.  
 
Table 3 Uncertainty and Exploitation in an ancient slave mode of production 
 Position with regard to Exploitation 
 Exploited 
Intermediate / 
Neutral 
Exploiter 
High   Slave Owner 
Medium Proles  
Exposure to 
economic 
uncertainty 
Low Slave   
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has investigated the relations between exploitation and uncertainty in three 
different modes of production. We are now in a position to compare the results (Table 4). To 
simplify the comparison this section will only look at fundamental class positions. The key 
finding is that the configurations differ substantially. Slavery is unique in that the exploited is 
exposed to little economic uncertainty, but high personal uncertainty. This is due to the 
complete subordination of the slave to his owner, who has full discretion over the slave, but 
also has an economic interest in the slave’s survival. The slave can be (relatively) certain to 
get exactly enough for survival, but no more. In this case extreme exploitation comes with 
little exposure to economic uncertainty. This aspect of uncertainty is entirely borne by the 
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slave owner. In feudalism the exploited serfs are exposed to a medium level of uncertainty. 
They have direct access to their means of production and are able to provide for their own 
subsistence. The economic uncertainties faced by feudal lords originate out of the possibility 
of crop failure. They also face the personal uncertainties associated with warfare. Finally, 
capitalism is unique in that economic uncertainty plays a key role for the exploitation process 
itself. Not only has the capitalist the possibility of firing workers in the case of a recession 
(whereas a feudal landlord could not and would not wish to “fire” serfs), and thereby shift the 
burden of macroeconomic uncertainty to workers. The firing threat is an important means to 
maintain discipline in the capitalist factory. As wage laborers have no means of reproducing 
themselves outside the capitalist process, they depend on employment. Hence Joan 
Robinson’s dictum: “The misery of being exploited [in capitalism] is nothing compared to the 
misery of not being exploited” (Robinson 1962, 46).18 It is only in capitalism that the lack of 
legal subordination of the exploited class has to be compensated by economic means, 
uncertainty being an important component of this. 
 
Table 4.: Exploitation and economic uncertainty: fundamental classes 
 
 
Position with respect to exploitation 
 Exploited Exploiter 
High 
Medium 
 
 
Exposure to 
economic 
uncertainty 
Low 
Wage laborer 
 
Serf 
 
Slave 
Slave owner 
 
Feudal lord 
Capitalist 
 
Some points of clarification are necessary. First, while the analysis is mostly derived from 
                                                 
18 We are grateful to Gary Langer for helping us locate this citation that has taken on a life of its own and is 
frequently found in the literature without precise reference. 
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theoretical concepts, the distribution of uncertainty can have immediate social significance 
and has indeed been subject to political struggles. Polanyi (1957, 92) cites David Davies 
confirming that rural workers experience the transformation to (urban) wage labor as 
associated (with a strongly disliked) increase in uncertainty: ”Workmen who are today fully 
employed may be tomorrow in the streets begging for bread (…) Uncertainty of labor 
conditions is the most vicious result of these new innovations.” More recently, the struggles 
over the welfare state can, of course, be interpreted as struggles over the distribution of 
uncertainty. 
 
Second, it should have become clear that there is no direct correspondence between the 
exposure to uncertainty and welfare. Rather the mode of production implies certain 
configurations of exploitation and uncertainty. The welfare effects of the distribution of 
uncertainty can only be analyzed within a specific mode of production. Exposure to economic 
uncertainty presupposes some degree of personal freedom and a minimum level of income 
and wealth. Therefore for a slave an increase in uncertainty could well be a welfare 
improvement as it had to come with an increase in freedom and possession. Whereas in 
capitalism an increase in uncertainty (brought about for example by a abolition of 
unemployment insurance system) will certainly have negative welfare effects for the wage 
laborer, as an increase in uncertainty will weaken his bargaining position with respect to the 
capitalist. 
 
The cross fertilization of Marxist and Post Keynesian concepts thus has proven fruitful and 
allows for a richer understanding of the notion of uncertainty as well as of that of class 
relations. Modes of production are not only characterized by a set of class relations but also 
come with a particular distribution of uncertainty. Uncertainty plays different roles in 
different modes of production and is closely linked, if historically in different forms, to the 
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processes and social foundations of exploitation. Uncertainty and its distribution are shaped 
by social structures and institutions. Different types of uncertainty are experienced by 
different classes in different modes of production.  
 
These findings raise many questions for future research. First, our analysis of the distribution 
of uncertainty between social classes implied an ordinal measure of uncertainty. Similarly, in 
the Treatise on Probability Keynes gives an ordering of different qualities of uncertainty. This 
ordinal concept of uncertainty deserves further elaboration. Second, the role of the state and 
other institutions has only been mentioned in passing. The welfare state in modern times as 
well as medieval guilds provides income security and insurance against an uncertain future. 
Thus institutions mediate the effects of uncertainty and historical analysis may prove 
insightful for understanding the changing role of institutions. Third the paper has focused on 
the nature and distribution of economic uncertainty across classes. The effects of different 
types of uncertainty on economic behavior and macroeconomic performance need more 
elaboration. Forth there are several possible lines of extension of our argument. As this paper 
has analyzed the distribution of uncertainty between classes in stylized modes of production, 
natural extensions include the distribution of uncertainty within classes and to incorporate 
other social divides such as race and gender into the analysis. Moreover one could analyze the 
configuration between uncertainty and exploitation for modes of regulation within the 
capitalist mode of production.  
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